U.S. Sanctions Tracker

The following is a list of actions taken by the U.S. government in response to gross human rights violations against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim groups [Updated March 2024].

Summary:

117 punitive sanctions (60 Chinese companies; 35 Chinese officials and government agencies. Some are subject to two or more sanctions.)
5 laws, policy statements, and advisories
11 investment bans
The Xinjiang Construction and Production Corps (XPCC) is under four separate sanctions
The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, a law banning the import of products made with Uyghur forced labor, went into effect on June 21, 2022

Global Magnitsky human rights sanctions
Import bans based on human rights violations
Export bans based on human rights violations
Investment bans for Chinese companies responsible for, or complicit in, human rights violations
Visa bans on officials responsible for human rights violations and for transnational repression

Atrocity Crimes Statement by Secretary Blinken: the PRC continues to Commit Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity
Atrocity Crimes Determination: Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity
Surveillance technology export license policy revision
Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory
Department of Labor Product List July 2021

Global Magnitsky sanctions

	Entity (2)	Date Sanctioned
1	Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)¹	07/31/2020
2	Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB)²	07/09/2020

	Individual (12)	Position	Sanctioned
1	Gao Qi	Former head of the Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau, former vice governor, Yili Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture³	12/8/23
2	Hu Lianhe	Deputy Office Director for the Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (XWCSG)⁴	12/8/23
3	Shohrat Zakir	Chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (2018–2021)⁵	12/10/21
4	Erken Tuniyaz	Chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (2021–)⁶	12/10/21
5	Wang Junzheng	Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)⁷	3/22/21
6	Chen Mingguo	Director of the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB)⁸	3/22/21
7	Peng Jiarui	Deputy Party Secretary and Commander of the XPCC⁹	7/31/20
8	Sun Jinlong	Former Political Commissar of the XPCC¹⁰	7/31/20
9	Chen Quanguo	Communist Party Secretary of XUAR [Politburo Member]¹¹	7/9/20
10	Zhu Hailun	Former Deputy Party Secretary of the XUAR¹²	7/9/20
11	Wang Mingshan	Director and Communist Party Secretary of the XPSB¹³	7/9/20
12	Huo Liujun	Former Party Secretary of the XPSB¹⁴	7/9/20

Import bans

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland Security

Federal statute 19 U.S.C. 1307 prohibits the importation of merchandise mined, manufactured, or produced, wholly or in part, by forced labor, including convict labor, forced child labor, and indentured labor.

	Entity (12)	Date Sanctioned	Date Announced
1	Withhold Release Order (WRO) on Silica-Based Products produced by Hoshine Silicon Industry Co. Ltd. in Xinjiang. The WRO applies to silica-based products made by Hoshine and its subsidiaries as well as to materials and goods (such as polysilicon) derived from or produced using those silica-based products. Silica is a raw material that is used to make components for solar panels, electronics, and other goods.¹⁵	06/24/2021	06/24/2021
2	Region-wide ban on all cotton and tomato products produced in Xinjiang, based on information that reasonably indicates the use of detainee or prison labor and situations of forced labor. The agency identified the following forced labor indicators through the course of its investigation: debt bondage, restriction of movement, isolation, intimidation and threats, withholding of wages, and abusive living and working conditions.¹⁶	01/13/2021	01/13/2021
3	Shipments containing cotton and cotton products originating from the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), based on information that reasonably indicates the use of forced labor, including convict labor. The WRO applies to all cotton and cotton products produced by the XPCC and its subordinate and affiliated entities as well as any products that are made in whole or in part with or derived from that cotton, such as apparel, garments, and textiles.¹⁷	11/03/2020	12/02/2020
4	All products made with labor from the Lop County No. 4 Vocational Skills Education and Training Center in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China. Information reasonably indicates that this “re-education” internment camp, which is often called a Vocational Skills Education and Training Center, is providing prison labor to nearby manufacturing entities in Xinjiang. CBP identified forced labor indicators including highly coercive/unfree recruitment, work and life under duress, and restriction of movement.¹⁸	08/25/20	09/14/2020
5	Hair products made in the Lop County Hair Product Industrial Park in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China. Information reasonably indicates this site is manufacturing products with forced labor of the Uyghur people and other minority ethnic groups who are detained in “re-education” internment camps in Xinjiang. CBP identified forced labor indicators including highly coercive/unfree recruitment, work and life under duress, and restriction of movement.¹⁹	08/25/20	09/14/2020
6	Yili Zhuowan Garment Manufacturing Co., Ltd. in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China. Information reasonably indicates that these entities use prison and forced labor in apparel production. CBP identified forced labor indicators including the restriction of movement, isolation, intimidation and threats, withholding of wages, and abusive working and living conditions.²⁰	09/03/2020	09/14/2020
7	Baoding LYSZD Trade and Business Co., Ltd in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China. Information reasonably indicates that these entities use prison and forced labor in apparel production. CBP identified forced labor indicators including the restriction of movement, isolation, intimidation and threats, withholding of wages, and abusive working and living conditions.²¹	09/03/2020	09/14/2020
8	Cotton produced and processed by Xinjiang Junggar Cotton and Linen Co., Ltd. in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China. Information reasonably indicates that this entity and its subsidiaries use prison labor in their raw cotton processing operations in Xinjiang. Cotton-processing factories and cotton farms in this region are prison enterprises that use convict labor.²²	09/08/2020	09/14/2020
9	Computer parts made by Hefei Bitland Information Technology Co., Ltd. in Anhui, China. Information reasonably indicates that Hefei Bitland uses both prison and forced labor to produce electronics. CBP identified forced labor indicators including abuse of vulnerability, restriction of movement, isolation, and intimidation and threats.²³	09/08/2020	09/14/2020
10	Lop County Meixin Hair Products Co., Ltd.²⁴	06/17/2020	06/17/2020
11	Hetian Haolin Hair Accessories Co., Ltd.²⁵	05/01/2020	05/01/2020
12	Hetian Taida Apparel Co., Ltd.²⁶	09/30/2019	09/30/2019

Export Bans (BIS Entity List)

Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Commerce

The BIS entity list comprises 53 companies and 21 government agencies, for a total of 74 entities related to the Uyghur Region.

	Companies (50)	Date Sanctioned
1	BGI Research²⁷	3/2/23
2	BGI Tech Solutions²⁸	3/2/23
3	Forensic Genomics International²⁹	3/2/23
4	China Academy of Electronics and Information Technology³⁰	7/12/21
5	Xinjiang Lianhai Chuangzhi Information Technology Co., Ltd.³¹	7/12/21
6	Leon Technology Co., Ltd.³²	7/12/21
7	Xinjiang Tangli Technology Co., Ltd.³³	7/12/21
8	Shenzhen Cobber Information Technology Co., Ltd.³⁴	7/12/21
9	Xinjiang Sailing Information Technology Co., Ltd.³⁵	7/12/21
10	Beijing Geling Shentong Information Technology Co., Ltd.³⁶	7/12/21
11	Tongfang R.I.A. Co., Ltd.³⁷	7/12/21
12	Shenzhen Hua’antai Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.³⁸	7/12/21
13	Chengdu Xiwu Security System Alliance Co., Ltd.³⁹	7/12/21
14	Beijing Sinonet Science & Technology Co., Ltd.⁴⁰	7/12/21
15	Urumqi Tianyao Weiye Information Technology Service Co., Ltd.⁴¹	7/12/21
16	Suzhou Keda Technology Co., Ltd.⁴²	7/12/21
17	Xinjiang Beidou Tongchuang Information Technology Co., Ltd.⁴³	7/12/21
18	Hoshine Silicon Industry (Shanshan)⁴⁴	6/24/21
19	Xinjiang Daqo New Energy⁴⁵	6/24/21
20	Xinjiang East Hope Nonferrous Metals⁴⁶	6/24/21
21	Xinjiang GCL New Energy Material Technology⁴⁷	6/24/21
22	Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)⁴⁸	6/24/21
23	AGCU Scientech⁴⁹	12/18/20
24	China National Scientific Instruments and Materials (CNSIM)⁵⁰	12/18/20
25	DJI⁵¹	12/18/20
26	Kuang-Chi Group⁵²	12/18/20
27	Changji Esquel Textile Co. Ltd.⁵³	7/22/20
28	Hefei Bitland Information Technology Co. Ltd.⁵⁴	7/22/20
29	Hefei Meiling Co. Ltd.⁵⁵	7/22/20
30	Hetian Haolin Hair Accessories Co. Ltd.⁵⁶	7/22/20
31	Hetian Taida Apparel Co., Ltd.⁵⁷	7/22/20
32	KTK Group⁵⁸	7/22/20
33	Nanchang O-Film Tech⁵⁹	7/22/20
34	Nanjing Synergy Textiles Co. Ltd.⁶⁰	7/22/20
35	Tanyuan Technology Co. Ltd.⁶¹	7/22/20
36	Xinjiang Silk Road BGI⁶²	7/22/20
37	Beijing Liuhe BGI⁶³	7/22/20
38	Aksu Huafu Textiles Co.⁶⁴	6/5/20
39	CloudWalk Technology⁶⁵	6/5/20
40	FiberHome Technologies Group⁶⁶	6/5/20
41	Intellifusion⁶⁷	6/5/20
42	IS’Vision⁶⁸	6/5/20
43	Nanjing FiberHome Starrysky Communication Development Co.⁶⁹	6/5/20
44	NetPosa⁷⁰	6/5/20
45	SenseNets⁷¹	6/5/20
46	Dahua Technology⁷²	10/9/19
47	Hikvision⁷³	10/9/19
48	IFLYTEK⁷⁴	10/9/19
49	Megvii Technology⁷⁵	10/9/19
50	Beijing Sensetime Technology Development Co. Ltd.*⁷⁶	10/9/19
51	Xiamen Meiya Pico Information Co. Ltd.⁷⁷	10/9/19
52	Yitu Technologies⁷⁸	10/9/19
53	Yixin Science and Technology Co. Ltd.⁷⁹	10/9/19

Sources:

3/3/2023 Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Commerce Additions to the Entity List:

The ERC determined to add BGI Research; BGI Tech Solutions (Hongkong) Co., Ltd.; and Forensic Genomics International, to the Entity List, under the destination of China, pursuant to § 744.11 of the EAR. The addition of these entities is based upon information that indicates their collection and analysis of genetic data poses a significant risk of contributing to monitoring and surveillance by the government of China, which has been utilized in the repression of ethnic minorities in China. Information also indicates that the actions of these entities concerning the collection and analysis of genetic data present a significant risk of diversion to China's military programs. These entities are added with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR.

7/12/2021 Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Commerce Additions to the Entity List:

The ERC determined to add China Academy of Electronics and Information Technology; Xinjiang Lianhai Chuangzhi Information Technology Co., Ltd.; Leon Technology Co., Ltd.; Xinjiang Tangli Technology Co., Ltd.; Shenzhen Cobber Information Technology Co., Ltd.; Xinjiang Sailing Information Technology Co., Ltd.; Beijing Geling Shentong Information Technology Co., Ltd.; Tongfang R.I.A. Co., Ltd.; Shenzhen Hua'antai Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.; Chengdu Xiwu Security System Alliance Co., Ltd.; Beijing Sinonet Science & Technology Co., Ltd.; Urumqi Tianyao Weiye Information Technology Service Co., Ltd.; Suzhou Keda Technology Co., Ltd.; and Xinjiang Beidou Tongchuang Information Technology Co., Ltd. to the Entity List for enabling activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States. Specifically, these entities have been implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China's campaign of repression, mass detention, and high-technology surveillance against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

6/24/2021 Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Commerce Additions to the Entity List:

For each of the five entities described below [ . . .], ERC determined that the subject entities are engaging in or enabling activities contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests. These entities have been implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China's campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, forced labor and high-technology surveillance against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Specifically, the ERC determined that Xinjiang GCL New Energy Material Technology, Co. Ltd; Xinjiang Daqo New Energy, Co. Ltd; Xinjiang East Hope Nonferrous Metals Co. Ltd.; Hoshine Silicon Industry (Shanshan) Co., Ltd.; and Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps are engaging in activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States through participating in the practice of, accepting, or utilizing forced labor.

12/22/2020 Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Commerce Additions to the Entity List:

The ERC determined to add the entities AGCU Scientech; China National Scientific Instruments and Materials (CNSIM); DJI; and Kuang-Chi Group for activities contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests. Specifically, these four entities have enabled wide-scale human rights abuses within China through abusive genetic collection and analysis or high-technology surveillance, and/or facilitated the export of items by China that aid repressive regimes around the world, contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests.

07/22/2020 Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Commerce Additions to the Entity List:

For each of the eleven entities described below, the ERC [. . .] determined that the entities are engaging in or enabling activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States. All eleven entities have been implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China's campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, forced labor and high-technology surveillance against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Specifically, the ERC determined that Changji Esquel Textile Co. Ltd.; Hefei Bitland Information Technology Co. Ltd.; Hefei Meiling Co. Ltd.; Hetian Haolin Hair Accessories Co. Ltd.; Hetian Taida Apparel Co., Ltd.; KTK Group; Nanjing Synergy Textiles Co. Ltd.; Nanchang O-Film Tech; and Tanyuan Technology Co. Ltd. are engaging in activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States through the practice of forced labor involving members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR. The ERC also determined that Xinjiang Silk Road BGI and Beijing Liuhe BGI are enabling activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States through conducting genetic analyses used to further the repression of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR. All eleven entities have been implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China's campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, forced labor and high-technology surveillance against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

06/05/2020 Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Commerce Additions to the Entity List:

Pursuant to § 744.11(b) of the EAR, the ERC determined that the Ministry of Public Security's Institute of Forensic Science of China and Aksu Huafu Textiles Co. are engaging in activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States, and seven additional entities, CloudWalk Technology; FiberHome Technologies Group and its subsidiary Nanjing FiberHome Starrysky Communication Development Co.; NetPosa and its subsidiary SenseNets; Intellifusion; and IS'Vision are enabling activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States. Specifically, these entities have been implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China's campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, forced labor and high-technology surveillance against Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

10/09/2019 Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Commerce Additions to the Entity List:

Pursuant to § 744.11(b) of the EAR, the ERC determined that [. . .] eight additional entities are enabling activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States. Specifically, these entities have been implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China's campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, and high-technology surveillance against Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR [. . .]; Dahua Technology; Hikvision; IFLYTEK; Megvii Technology; Sense Time, Xiamen Meiya Pico Information Co. Ltd.; Yitu Technologies; and Yixin Science and Technology Co. Ltd.

*The Commerce Department revised the listing on June 5, 2020 by removing “SenseTime” and adding “Beijing Sensetime Technology Development Co.,” its sister-company. See here for additional reporting⁸⁰

	Government Entities (21)	Date Sanctioned
1	Ministry of Public Security’s Institute of Forensic Science of China**⁸¹	6/5/20
2	People’s Government Public Security Bureau of XUAR⁸²	10/9/19
3	Aksu District Public Security Bureau⁸³	10/9/19
4	Altay Municipality Public Security Bureau⁸⁴	10/9/19
5	Bayingolin Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau⁸⁵	10/9/19
6	Boertala Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau⁸⁶	10/9/19
7	Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau⁸⁷	10/9/19
8	Hami Municipality Public Security Bureau⁸⁸	10/9/19
9	Hetian Prefecture Public Security Bureau⁸⁹	10/9/19
10	Kashgar Prefecture Public Security Bureau⁹⁰	10/9/19
11	Kelamayi Municipality Public Security Bureau⁹¹	10/9/19
12	Kezilesu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau⁹²	10/9/19
13	Shihezi Municipality Public Security Bureau⁹³	10/9/19
14	Tacheng Prefecture Public Security Bureau⁹⁴	10/9/19
15	Tumushuke Municipal Public Security Bureau⁹⁵	10/9/19
16	Turfan Municipality Public Security Bureau⁹⁶	10/9/19
17	Urumqi Municipal Public Security Bureau⁹⁷	10/9/19
18	Wujiaqu Municipality Public Security Bureau⁹⁸	10/9/19
19	Xinjiang Police College⁹⁹	10/9/19
20	Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Public Security Bureau¹⁰⁰	10/9/19
21	Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau¹⁰¹	10/9/19

Sources:

06/05/2020 Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Commerce Additions to the Entity List:

10/09/19 Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Commerce Additions to the Entity List:

Pursuant to § 744.11(b) of the EAR, the ERC determined that the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People's Government Public Security Bureau, eighteen of its subordinate municipal and county public security bureaus and one other subordinate institute are engaging in activities contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States [. . .]. Specifically, these entities have been implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China's campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, and high-technology surveillance against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in the XUAR. The entities are as follows: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) People's Government Public Security Bureau, eighteen of its subordinate municipal and county public security bureaus, and one other subordinate institute:—Aksu District Public Security Bureau; Altay Municipality Public Security Bureau; Bayingolin Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau; Boertala Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau; Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau; Hami Municipality Public Security Bureau; Hetian Prefecture Public Security Bureau; Kashgar Prefecture Public Security Bureau; Kelamayi Municipality Public Security Bureau; Kezilesu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau; Shihezi Municipality Public Security Bureau; Tacheng Prefecture Public Security Bureau; Tumushuke Municipal Public Security Bureau; Turfan Municipality Public Security Bureau; Urumqi Municipal Public Security Bureau; Wujiaqu Municipality Public Security Bureau; Xinjiang Police College; Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) Public Security Bureau; and Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture Public Security Bureau.

**The Commerce Department revised the listing on November 16, 2023 by removing the "Ministry of Public Security's Institute of Forensic Science of China" from the Entity List.

Investment Bans

	Entity (11)	Date Announced
1	Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co. Ltd. (E.O. 14032)¹⁰²¹⁰³	06/03/2021
2	Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (E.O. 14032)¹⁰⁴¹⁰⁵	06/03/2021
3	SenseTime Group Limited (SenseTime)¹⁰⁶	12/10/2021
4	Cloudwalk Technology Co., Ltd.¹⁰⁷	12/16/2021
5	Dawning Information Industry Co., Ltd.¹⁰⁸	12/16/2021
6	Leon Technology Company Limited¹⁰⁹	12/16/2021
7	Megvii Technology Limited¹¹⁰	12/16/2021
8	Netposa Technologies Limited¹¹¹	12/16/2021
9	Xiamen Meiya Pico Information Co., Ltd.¹¹²	12/16/2021
10	SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd.¹¹³	12/16/2021
11	Yitu Limited¹¹⁴	12/16/2021

Visa bans

State Department

Visa ban (2)	Date Announced
The State Department announced it imposed “visa restrictions on PRC officials” responsible for repressive policies targeting “religious and spiritual practitioners, members of ethnic minority groups, dissidents, human rights defenders, journalists, labor organizers, civil society organizers, and peaceful protestors in China and beyond.”¹¹⁵	03/21/2022
The State Department announced visa restrictions on Chinese government and Communist Party officials who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, the detention or abuse of Uighurs, Kazakhs, or other members of Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, China. Family members of such persons may also be subject to these restrictions.¹¹⁶	10/08/2019

Atrocity Crimes Determination

State Department

Promoting Accountability for Human Rights Abuse with Our Partners	Date Announced
Statement by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken: “Amid growing international condemnation, the PRC continues to commit genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. The United States reiterates its calls on the PRC to bring an end to the repression of Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang, including by releasing all those arbitrarily held in internment camps and detention facilities.”¹¹⁷	03/22/2021
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced his determination that since at least March 2017, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), under the direction and control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has committed crimes against humanity against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other members of ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang. These crimes are ongoing and include: the arbitrary imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty of more than one million civilians, forced sterilization, torture of a large number of those arbitrarily detained, forced labor, and the imposition of draconian restrictions on freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression, and freedom of movement. The Nuremberg Tribunals at the end of World War II prosecuted perpetrators for crimes against humanity, the same crimes being perpetrated in Xinjiang. In addition, after careful examination of the available facts, I have determined that the PRC, under the direction and control of the CCP, has committed genocide against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang. This genocide is ongoing, and is the systematic attempt to destroy Uyghurs by the Chinese party-state.¹¹⁸	01/19/2021

Promoting Accountability for Human Rights Abuse with Our Partners

Date Announced

Statement by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken: “Amid growing international condemnation, the PRC continues to commit genocide and crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. The United States reiterates its calls on the PRC to bring an end to the repression of Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang, including by releasing all those arbitrarily held in internment camps and detention facilities.”¹¹⁷

03/22/2021

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced his determination that since at least March 2017, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), under the direction and control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has committed crimes against humanity against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other members of ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang. These crimes are ongoing and include: the arbitrary imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty of more than one million civilians, forced sterilization, torture of a large number of those arbitrarily detained, forced labor, and the imposition of draconian restrictions on freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression, and freedom of movement. The Nuremberg Tribunals at the end of World War II prosecuted perpetrators for crimes against humanity, the same crimes being perpetrated in Xinjiang. In addition, after careful examination of the available facts, I have determined that the PRC, under the direction and control of the CCP, has committed genocide against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang. This genocide is ongoing, and is the systematic attempt to destroy Uyghurs by the Chinese party-state.¹¹⁸

01/19/2021

Export license policy revised to include risk of human rights abuse in all decisions, including private-sector end-users

Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Commerce Department

Revision of Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Export licensing decisions are now based in part on the risk that controlled items may be used by any end-users, including private companies, to commit or enable human rights abuses.	Date Announced
In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the EAR by revising the licensing policy of paragraph (b) of § 742.7 to clarify to the exporting community that Commerce Control List (CCL) licensing decisions are based in part upon U.S. Government assessments about whether controlled items may be used to engage in or enable violations or abuses of human rights, including those involving censorship, surveillance, detention, or excessive use of force. This revision furthers the foreign policy interests of the United States pertaining to the prevention of human rights violations and abuses by helping to ensure that items are not exported or reexported in support of human rights violations or abuses, including telecommunications and information security and sensors. This licensing policy enables BIS and other reviewing agencies to consider violations or abuses of human rights by individuals or entities other than the government of the importing country, such as companies. Additional notes: (1) In removing the “internationally recognized” standard from “human rights” in § 742.7(b), BIS can make decisions based on US Government determinations. (2) BIS needs only judge that there is a “risk” that the items would be used in such a manner.¹¹⁹¹²⁰	06/10/2020

Revision of Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Export licensing decisions are now based in part on the risk that controlled items may be used by any end-users, including private companies, to commit or enable human rights abuses.

Date Announced

In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the EAR by revising the licensing policy of paragraph (b) of § 742.7 to clarify to the exporting community that Commerce Control List (CCL) licensing decisions are based in part upon U.S. Government assessments about whether controlled items may be used to engage in or enable violations or abuses of human rights, including those involving censorship, surveillance, detention, or excessive use of force. This revision furthers the foreign policy interests of the United States pertaining to the prevention of human rights violations and abuses by helping to ensure that items are not exported or reexported in support of human rights violations or abuses, including telecommunications and information security and sensors. This licensing policy enables BIS and other reviewing agencies to consider violations or abuses of human rights by individuals or entities other than the government of the importing country, such as companies. Additional notes: (1) In removing the “internationally recognized” standard from “human rights” in § 742.7(b), BIS can make decisions based on US Government determinations. (2) BIS needs only judge that there is a “risk” that the items would be used in such a manner.¹¹⁹¹²⁰

06/10/2020

Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisories

Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury and Homeland Security

Business Advisories	Date Announced
Updated Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory: The Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, Labor, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative issued an updated Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory “to highlight the heightened risks for businesses with supply chain and investment links to Xinjiang, given the entities complicit in forced labor and other human rights abuses there and throughout China.”¹²¹	07/13/2021
Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory: The Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury and Homeland Security jointly issued a business advisory. “China continues to commit brutal human rights abuses against ethnic minorities from Xinjiang, including operating dystopian surveillance systems and employing the contemptible practice of forced labor,” said Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. “This business advisory highlights the risks U.S. companies, individuals, and other organizations face when dealing with entities involved in these human rights abuses.”¹²²	07/01/2020

Business Advisories

Date Announced

Updated Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory: The Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Homeland Security, Labor, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative issued an updated Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory “to highlight the heightened risks for businesses with supply chain and investment links to Xinjiang, given the entities complicit in forced labor and other human rights abuses there and throughout China.”¹²¹

07/13/2021

Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory: The Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury and Homeland Security jointly issued a business advisory. “China continues to commit brutal human rights abuses against ethnic minorities from Xinjiang, including operating dystopian surveillance systems and employing the contemptible practice of forced labor,” said Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. “This business advisory highlights the risks U.S. companies, individuals, and other organizations face when dealing with entities involved in these human rights abuses.”¹²²

07/01/2020

Additions to List of Goods Produced by Child Labor of Forced Labor (TVPRA List)

Department of Labor

List of Goods	Date Announced
In a statement titled “Against Their Will: The Situation in Xinjiang,” the Department of Labor added five goods produced by forced labor by Muslim ethnic groups in China to the 2020 edition of the List of Goods Produced by Child Labor of Forced Labor (TVPRA List). These goods include gloves, hair products, textiles, thread/yarn, and tomato products. The statement noted the vast scale of abuse, saying it serves as a notice for the world to ask questions, take action, and demand change.¹²³	September 2020

List of Goods

Date Announced

In a statement titled “Against Their Will: The Situation in Xinjiang,” the Department of Labor added five goods produced by forced labor by Muslim ethnic groups in China to the 2020 edition of the List of Goods Produced by Child Labor of Forced Labor (TVPRA List). These goods include gloves, hair products, textiles, thread/yarn, and tomato products. The statement noted the vast scale of abuse, saying it serves as a notice for the world to ask questions, take action, and demand change.¹²³

September 2020

U.S. Sanctions Tracker

Global Magnitsky sanctions

Import bans

Export Bans (BIS Entity List)

Investment Bans

Visa bans

Atrocity Crimes Determination

Export license policy revised to include risk of human rights abuse in all decisions, including private-sector end-users

Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisories

Additions to List of Goods Produced by Child Labor of Forced Labor (TVPRA List)

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